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Background: A permit to work (PTW) is a formal written system to control certain types of work which
are identiﬁed as potentially hazardous. However, human error in PTW processes can lead to an accident.
Methods: This cross-sectional, descriptive study was conducted to estimate the probability of human
errors in PTW processes in a chemical plant in Iran. In the ﬁrst stage, through interviewing the personnel
and studying the procedure in the plant, the PTW process was analyzed using the hierarchical task
analysis technique. In doing so, PTWwas considered as a goal and detailed tasks to achieve the goal were
analyzed. In the next step, the standardized plant analysis risk-human (SPAR-H) reliability analysis
method was applied for estimation of human error probability.
Results: The mean probability of human error in the PTW system was estimated to be 0.11. The highest
probability of human error in the PTW process was related to ﬂammable gas testing (50.7%).
Conclusion: The SPAR-H method applied in this study could analyze and quantify the potential human
errors and extract the required measures for reducing the error probabilities in PTW system. Some
suggestions to reduce the likelihood of errors, especially in the ﬁeld of modifying the performance
shaping factors and dependencies among tasks are provided.
Copyright  2015, Occupational Safety and Health Research Institute. Published by Elsevier. This is an
open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
According to investigations on industrial accidents, human er-
rors account for > 90% of accidents in nuclear industries, > 80% of
accidents in chemical industries, > 75% of maritime accidents, and
> 70% of aviation accidents [1]. Human error also constitutes one of
the direct causes of some of the most shocking industrial accidents
which have occurred around the world such as Bhopal in India
(1984), Piper Alpha in the United Kingdom (1988), Chernobyl in
Ukraine (1986), and Texaco Reﬁnery in Wales (1994) [2].
In the worst industrial accident in world history, the Bhopal
disaster, a combination of operator error, poor maintenance, failed
safety systems, and poor safety management were identiﬁed as theee, Department of Occupational He
ngiri); hobobinaser@yahoo.com (N
pational Safety and Health Researc
/4.0/).causes of leakedmethyl isocyanate gas from a pesticide plant which
led to the creation of a dense toxic cloud and killed > 2,500 people.
The explosion and ﬁre accident which occurred in the Piper Alpha
offshore oil and gas platform and killed 167 workers was attributed
mainly to human error including deﬁciencies in the permit to work
(PTW) system, deﬁcient analysis of hazards, and inadequate
training in the use of safety procedures. In the Chornobyl accident,
operator error and operating instructions and design deﬁciencies
were found to be the twomain factors responsible for the explosion
of a 1,000 MW reactor which released radioactive materials that
spread over much of Europe. Finally, the main cause of the Texaco
Reﬁnery explosion, caused by continuously pumping inﬂammable
hydrocarbon liquid into a process vessel which had a closed outlet,alth, Shiraz University of Medical Sciences, School of Health, Koy-e-Zahra Street, PO
. Hoboubi).
h Institute. Published by Elsevier. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
Fig. 1. Schematic diagram of the human reliability assessment using the SPAR-H technique. HEP, human error probability; HFE, human failure event; PSFs, performance shaping
factors; SPAR-H, standardized plant analysis risk-human.
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equipment, and control systems, such as the inaccurate control
system reading of a valve state, modiﬁcations which had not been
fully assessed, failure to provide operators with the necessary
process overviews, and attempts to keep the unit running when it
should have been shut down [3].
Human error has been deﬁned as any improper decision or
behavior which may have a negative impact on the effectiveness,
safety, or performance system [4]. A PTW is a formal written
system to control certain types of works which are identiﬁed as
potentially hazardous. This system may need to be used in high-
risk jobs such as hot works, conﬁned space entries, maintenance
activities, carrying hazardous substances, and electrical or me-
chanical isolations [5]. In this system, responsible individuals
should assess work procedures and check the safety at all stages of
the work. Moreover, permits are effective means of communica-
tion among site managers, plant supervisors, and operators, and
the individuals who carrying out the work. The people doing the
job sign the permit to show that they understand the risks and the
necessary precautions [6].
Although a PTW is an integral part of a safe system of work and
can be helpful in the proper management of a wide range of ac-
tivities, it may be susceptible to human error itself. For instance, a
breakdown in the PTW system at shift change over and in the safety
procedures was one of the major factors that resulted in theexplosion and ﬁre accident of the Piper Alpha oil and gas platform
[7]. Also, the lack of an issued permit for the actual job was one of
the reasons for the Hickson and Welch accident in 1992 [8].
Up to now, very limited studies have been conducted regarding
human error analysis in the PTW system. Hoboubi et al [9] inves-
tigated the human error probabilities (HEPs) in a PTW using an
engineering approach and estimated the HEP to range from 0.044
to 0.383. In another study conducted by the same authors [10],
human errors in the PTW system were identiﬁed and analyzed
using the predictive human error analysis technique. The most
important identiﬁed errors in that study were inadequate isolation
of process equipment, inadequate labeling of equipment, a delay in
starting the work after issuing the work permit, improper gas
testing, and inadequate site preparation measures. Moreover,
ﬁndings of a study conducted by Haji Hosseini et al [11] on the
evaluation of factors contributing to human error in the process of
PTW issuing indicated a signiﬁcant correlation between the errors
and training, work experience, and age of the individuals involved
in work permit issuance. However, as mentioned above, a limited
number of researches have analyzed the PTW process from the
human error point of view. Moreover, except for Hoboubi et al [9],
other studies were descriptive in nature and failed to quantify the
human errors in the PTW issuance process. In this context, the
present study aimed to identify and analyze human errors in
different steps of the PTW process in a chemical plant.
Saf Health Work 2016;7:6e1182. Material and methods
This cross-sectional, descriptive study was conducted to esti-
mate the probability of human errors in a PTW system in an Iranian
chemical plant. In the ﬁrst stage, through interviewing the
personnel and studying the procedures of various tasks in the plant,
the PTW process was analyzed by the hierarchical task analysis
(HTA) technique. In doing so, PTW was considered as a goal and
detailed tasks to achieve the goalwere analyzed. In thenext step, the
standardized plant analysis risk-human (SPAR-H) reliability analysis
method, developed by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission, was applied for estimation of HEP [12]. Although the SPAR-
H techniquewas originally developed in the nuclear power industry
and its application for the estimation of HEPs in outside process and
safety control tasks like those found in other industries (such as the
petrochemical industry) may be controversial in terms of type and
complexityof the tasks, physical and cognitive demands of the tasks,
and physical and mental requirements to the operators, it has
recently been used for human reliability analysis (Fig. 1.) in major
accident risk analyses in the Norwegian petroleum industry,
offshore drilling operations in the oil and gas industry, and
managed-pressure drilling operations [13,14].
The SPAR-H is a structural HRA technique used to identify and
calculate the probability of potential human error in the described
occupational tasks (human failure events-HFEs). It is based on a
basic nominal error rate, a set of performance shaping factorsTable 1
Rated PSFs and calculated PSFc in permit to work tasks in the studied petrochemical pla
Task/subtask Operator
Available
Time
(i1)
Stress/
stressors
(i2)
Comp
(i3)
1. Site inspection Shift
supervisor
10 1 1
2. Description of hot/cold work Shift
supervisor
10 1 1
3. Site preparation
3.1. Venting process
equipment from
ﬂammable & toxic
materials
Site Man 1 1 2 1
Site Man 2 1 2 1
3.2. Lock out & tag out
the electrical
equipment
Site Man 1 1 1 1
Site Man 2 1 1 1
3.3. Cleaning the work
area from ﬂammable
material
Site Man 1 1 1 1
Site Man 2 1 1 1
3.4. Isolation of process
equipment
Site Man 1 1 2 2
Site Man 2 1 1 2
4. Flammable gas testing Site Man 1 1 1 1
Site Man 2 1 1 1
5. Oxygen & toxic gas testing Safety
Ofﬁcer
1 1 1
6. Specify the protective devices on the
permit
Shift
Supervisor
1 1 2
7. Specify safety measures on the permit Shift
Supervisor
1 1 2
8. Show work area to operator Site Man 1 1 2 1
Site Man 2 1 2 1
9. Site inspection by shift supervisor Shift
Supervisor
10 1 1
10. Signing the permit Shift
Supervisor
1 1 1
11. Validation & revalidation after shift
handover
Shift
Supervisor
1 1 1
PSF, performance shaping factor; PSFc, the composite PSF.(factors that affect human error), and the error dependency be-
tween tasks.
According to Whaley et al [15], the steps for using the SPAR-H in
human reliability analysis in PTW in the studied petrochemical
plant of the current research were as follows. (1) Categorizing the
HFE as diagnosis and/or action. In the ﬁrst step, identiﬁed HFEs in
the PTW tasks were categorized as either diagnosis tasks (cognitive
processing) or action tasks (execution) or combined diagnosis and
action. (2) Evaluating and rating the performance shaping factors
(PSFs). In this stage, all of the HFEs were evaluated based on eight
PSFs, including available time, stress/stressor, complexity, experi-
ence/training, procedure, ergonomics/human-machine interface
(HMI), ﬁtness for duty, and work process. The level of each PSF was
determined based on the SPAR-H procedure (Table 1). Therefore,
each PSF was examined and rated with respect to the context of the
HFE. For this purpose, operators involved in the PTW procedure
were interviewed and monitored during the PTW issuing activities.
Then, the corresponding levels of PSFs were selected from the PSFs
table based on the SPAR-H procedure (Table 2) [12]. If there was not
enough information available to provide an informed judgment, the
PSF was assumed to be nominal. (3) Calculating PSF-modiﬁed HEP.
Once the PSF levels have been assigned, then the ﬁnal HEP was
simply the product of the basic HEP and the PSF multipliers [Eq. (1)].
HEP ¼ NHEP PSFc (1)nt
PSF
lexity Experience/
Training
(i4)
Procedure
(i5)
Ergonomics
(i6)
Fitness
for duty
(i7)
Work
processes
(i8)
PSFc ¼ PPSFs
1 1 1 1 1 10
1 1 1 1 1 10
3 5 1 1 1 30
1 5 1 1 1 10
3 5 1 1 1 15
1 5 1 1 1 5
3 5 1 1 1 15
1 5 1 1 1 5
3 5 1 1 1 60
1 5 1 1 1 10
3 5 1 1 1 15
1 5 1 1 1 5
0.5 1 1 1 0.5 0.25
1 5 1 1 0.8 8
1 5 1 1 0.8 8
3 5 1 1 1 30
1 5 1 1 1 10
0.5 1 1 1 1 5
0.5 1 1 1 1 0.5
0.5 1 1 1 1 0.5
Table 2
A sample of the SPAR-Hworksheet for PSF evaluation in “ﬂammable gas testing” task
conducted by site men
Action portion
PSF PSF level Multiplier
for action
Site Man 1
Multiplier
for action
Site Man 2
Available
time
Inadequate time p (failure) ¼ 1 p (failure) ¼ 1
Time available isw the
time required
10 10
Nominal time 1 1
Time available is  5 the
time required
0.1 0.1
Time available  50 the
time required
0.01 0.01
Stress/
stressors
Extreme 5 5
High 2 2
Nominal 1 1
Insufﬁcient information 1 1
Complexity Highly complex 5 5
Moderately complex 2 2
Nominal 1 1
Insufﬁcient information 1 1
Experience/
Training
Low 3 3
Nominal 1 1
High 0.5 0.5
Insufﬁcient Information 1 1
Procedure Not available 50 50
Incomplete 20 20
Available, but poor 5 5
Nominal 1 1
Insufﬁcient information 1 1
Ergonomics Missing/misleading 50 50
Poor 10 10
Nominal 1 1
Good 0.5 0.5
Insufﬁcient information 1 1
Fitness for
duty
Unﬁt p (failure) ¼ 1 p (failure) ¼ 1
Degrade ﬁtness 5 5
Nominal 1 1
Insufﬁcient information 1 1
Work
processes
Poor 5 5
Nominal 1 1
Good 0.5 0.5
Insufﬁcient information 1 1
PPSF ¼ 15 PPSF ¼ 5
PSF, performance shaping factor; SPAR-H, standardized plant analysis risk-human.
Note: Gray color shows the selected PSFs level.
M. Jahangiri et al / Human Error Analysis in Permit to Work System 9When diagnosis and actionwere combined into a single HFE, the
two HEPs were calculated separately and then summed to produce
the composite HEP. For tasks with at least three negative PSFs
(based on PSF levels), HEP was calculated using Eq. (2).
HEP ¼ ðNHEP  PSFcÞ
NHEP ðPSFc  1Þ þ 1 (2)
In Eqs. (1) and (2), PSFc is the composite PSF (PSF multipliers)
and NHEP is the nominal HEP. According to the SPAR-H method-
ology, NHEPs for action and diagnostic activities were considered as
0.001 and 0.01, respectively [12]. These nominal SPAR-H HEP values
are based on error rates for simple action implementation (such as
pressing a button or turning a dial, and simple slips or lapses) and
cognitive processing in diagnosis activities [15,16]. (4) Calculating
ﬁnal HEP for dependent and independent tasks. Eq. (3) was used to
compute the HEP for independent tasks.
PW=OD ¼ HEPD þ HEPA (3)
where PW/OD ¼ HEP for independent tasks, HEPD ¼ HEP for diag-
nostic activities, and HEPA¼ HEP for action activities). With respect
to the dependent tasks, the role of dependency among the PTWtasks was corrected. In doing so, dependency level (complete, high,
moderate, low, and zero) was determined based on the location of
doing the tasks (same or different), cause (additional or not addi-
tional), time (close in time or not), and crew (same or different)
using the dependency table in the SPAR-H procedure and conse-
quently the ﬁnal HEP was calculated (Table 3) [12].
3. Results
The PTW process in the studied plant involved four operators
including two site men: Site Man 1 (28 years old with 6 months
working experience) and Site Man 2 (26 years old with 2 years
working experience), one shift supervisor (39 years old with 12
years working experience), and one safety ofﬁcer (29 years old with
5 years working experience).
The results of HTA in PTW tasks are presented in Table 1. As the
table depicts, the PTW procedure consisted of 11 main tasks and
four subtasks. Table 1 also presents the level of PSFs and calculated
PSFc in each task of the PTW process for all the operators involved.
Table 4 presents the values of HEPD, HEPA, HEPWO/D, HEPW/D, and
total HEP for each task in the PTW process. Accordingly, the mean
HEP in the PTW process was 0.112. In addition, the highest proba-
bility of human error related to ﬂammable gas testing. The com-
parison of HEP among different occupational groups involved in the
PTW procedure has been presented in Fig. 2. According to this
ﬁgure, among the individuals involved in the PTW process, site
men had the highest probability of human errors. A sample of the
SPAR-H worksheet used for the evaluation of PSFs and determi-
nation of dependency in the “ﬂammable gas testing” task have been
shown in Tables 2 and 3, respectively.
4. Discussion
This study aimed to estimate the probability of human errors in
the PTW procedure using the SPAR-H technique. The results
showed the mean probability of human error in the PTW system to
be 0.112. Additionally, the highest probability of human error in the
PTW process was related to “ﬂammable gas testing” (0.507).
The results of the current study also revealed that the proba-
bility of human error was higher in the tasks performed by sitemen
when compared with other occupational groups involved in the
PTW procedure. Besides this, the highest probability of human er-
ror was related to Site Man 1 (0.507) and Site Man 2 (0.502) in the
“ﬂammable gas testing” task, which could be attributed to unsuit-
ability of the PSF level (low experience and training and poor
procedure) in site men compared to other groups. Considering the
knowledge-based nature of the ﬂammable gas testing task [9], low
education and experience levels may reduce the operators’ tech-
nical skills and increase the probability of knowledge-based errors
[17]. This ﬁnding is consistent with the ﬁndings of the current study
conducted on the PTW process [9].
Due to the appropriate level of PSFs and the low level of de-
pendency, HEP was lower in the tasks performed by the shift su-
pervisor when compared with other tasks. Among the tasks carried
out by the shift supervisor, the highest probability of human error
was related to “specifying the required personal protection equip-
ment” and “determining precautions in the permit” tasks, which is
due to the diagnostic nature of these tasks.
In the only task conducted by the safety ofﬁcer, HEP was
computed as 0.002 which is the minimum probability among all
the tasks in the PTW process. This resulted from the fact that the
safety ofﬁcer had the most appropriate PSFs level.
The HEP values obtained in the present study were higher when
compared with those reported in previous work [9]. This difference
in error probability can be explained by differences between the
Table 3
A sample of the SPAR-H worksheet for dependency determination in “ﬂammable gas testing” task
Condition
number
Crew (some
or different)
Time (close in time
or not close in time)
Location (some
or different)
Cause (additional or
not additional)
Dependency HEP calculation formula
1 s c s na Complete The probability of failure is 1
2 a Complete
3 d na High (1 þ PW/OD)/2
4 a High
5 nc s na High
6 a Moderate (1 þ 6  PW/OD)/7
7 d na Moderate
8 a Low (1 þ 19  PW/OD)/20
9 d c s na Moderate (1 þ 6  PW/OD)/7
10 a Moderate
11 d na Moderate
12 a Moderate
13 nc s na Low (1 þ 19  PW/OD)/20
14 a Low
15 d na Low
16 A Low
17 Zero The probability of failure is PW/OD
a, additional; c, close in time; d, different; HEP, human error probability; na, not additional; nc, not close in time; PW/OD, probability without dependency; s, same; SPAR-H,
standardized plant analysis risk-human.
Note: Gray color shows the selected dependency level and its corresponding formula for HEP calculation.
Saf Health Work 2016;7:6e1110types of techniques used for human error assessment and the ﬁelds
studied. The highest human error values in both studies were
related to “ﬂammable gas testing” tasks.
According to the PTW procedure in the studied chemical plant,
site men were responsible for both “isolation of process equip-
ment” and “ﬂammable gas testing” tasks. Furthermore, there was
no appropriate speciﬁc procedure for gas testing in the studied
plant. Based on the SPAR-H methodology, this led to a high de-
pendency level and caused the error probabilities of 0.507 and
0.502 for Site Men 1 and 2 respectively in the gas testing task. By
employing a qualiﬁed person for gas testing (except site men) as
well as by providing an appropriate procedure, the level of de-
pendency can be reduced. In this way, the ﬁnal HEP of this taskTable 4
Human error probability in a permit to work process in the studied chemical plant
Task/subtask Operato
1. Site inspection Shift Su
2. Description of hot/cold work Shift Su
3. Site preparation
3.1. Venting process equipment from ﬂammable & toxic materials Site Ma
Site Ma
3.2. Lock out & tag out the electrical equipment Site Ma
Site Ma
3.3. Cleaning the work area from ﬂammable material Site Ma
Site Ma
3.4. Isolation of process equipment Site Ma
Site Ma
4. Flammable gas testing Site Ma
Site Ma
5. Oxygen & toxic gas testing Safety O
6. Specify the protective devices in the permit Shift Su
7. Specify safety measures in the permit Shift Su
8. Showing work area to operator Site Ma
Site Ma
9. Site inspection by shift control Shift Su
10. Signing the permit Shift Su
11. Validation & revalidation after shift handover Shift Su
PSFc
HEP, human error probability; HEPA, human error probability in action tasks; HEPD, hum
composite PSF; PW/D, probability with dependency; PW/OD, probability without dependewould reduce to 0.064 for Site Man 1 and to 0.054 for Site Man 2,
which is 8e9 times lower.
In the present study, the estimated HEPs for the “ﬂammable gas
testing” task was unexpectedly high (0.5). This indicated the high
level of dependency in this task (Table 3). According to the SPAR-H
methodology, for the tasks with high dependency levels, HEP is at
least 0.5, even if all PSFs are at appropriate levels.
One of the limitations of the present study was that it only
measured HEP in the general procedure of the PTW system in the
studied plant. Therefore, the ﬁndings might not be generalized to
all PTW procedures and a work permit for any speciﬁc work should
be studied for potential human errors. Moreover, SPAR-H is a
technique developed for the nuclear industry and may not be fullyr PSFC HEPD HEPA PW/OD PW/D Final HEP
pervisor 10 e 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
pervisor 10 e 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
n 1 30 e 0.029 0.029 0.168 0.168
n 2 10 e 0.01 0.01 0.151 0.151
n 1 15 e 0.015 0.015 0.156 0.156
n 2 5 e 0.005 0.005 0.147 0.147
n 1 15 e 0.015 0.015 0.064 0.064
n 2 5 e 0.005 0.005 0.055 0.055
n 1 60 e 0.056 0.056 0.191 0.191
n 2 10 e 0.01 0.01 0.151 0.151
n 1 15 e 0.015 0.015 0.507 0.507
n 2 5 e 0.005 0.005 0.502 0.502
fﬁcer 0.25 e 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
pervisor 8 0.04 e 0.04 0.04 0.04
pervisor 8 0.04 e 0.04 0.04 0.04
n 1 30 e 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029
n 2 10 e 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
pervisor 5 e 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
pervisor 0.5 0.005 e 0.005 0.005 0.005
pervisor 0.5 0.005 e 0.005 0.005 0.005
12.61 0.112
an error probability in diagnostics tasks; PSF, performance shaping factor; PSFc, the
ncy.
Fig. 2. The mean probability of human errors in the operators involved in the work
permit system in the studied chemical plant.
M. Jahangiri et al / Human Error Analysis in Permit to Work System 11applicable to all situations in process industries. Therefore, more
studies are necessary to customize and validate the PSFs for work
situations in petrochemical industries.
In conclusion, the SPAR-Hmethod applied in this study could be
used to analyze and quantify potential human errors and extract
the required measures necessary to reduce error probabilities in a
PTW system. Based on the results, the following suggestions are
provided to reduce the likelihood of errors: (1) employing a qual-
iﬁed person for gas testing (except site men). In this way, the de-
pendency level of tasks conducted by site men will be reduced; (2)
providing a speciﬁc appropriate procedure for the task of “ﬂam-
mable gas testing”; (3) revising the PTW procedure for detailed
explanation of responsibilities of all the operators involved in PTW
issuance and its related work activities; and (4) as a simple and
appropriate solution, the automation of the PTW issuance proce-
dure can be very effective in preventing and reducing the proba-
bility of human errors.Conﬂicts of interest
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